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In recent years, the number of stockholders suﬀering huge losses during market
downturns while liquidity restrictions prohibited them from selling their shares has
skyrocketed.1 These types of restrictions are widespread, aﬀecting entrepreneurs,
venture capitalists, private equityholders, corporate oﬃcers, managers, and many
others. For example, lockup restrictions are often imposed as part of the initial
public oﬀering (IPO) process. More broadly, however, selling restrictions are usually
included in executive stock or stock-option based compensation contracts. In addi-
tion, Rule 144 of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) places severe
restrictions on the ability of most corporate insiders and aﬃliates to sell shares in
their ﬁrm. Because of these restrictions, some stockholders bear the costs of holding
an illiquid undiversiﬁed portfolio for many years.
Although the beneﬁts of liquidity restrictions in retaining key employees and
managers and in reducing agency conﬂicts are well understood, the costs imposed by
these restrictions have been largely unexplored. Accordingly, the goal of this paper
is to examine how selling or liquidity restrictions aﬀect the welfare of stockholders.
Since these stockholders often have a substantial stake in their venture, we will refer
to them simply as entrepreneurs throughout the paper to make the intuition more
clear. To study the eﬀects of liquidity restrictions, we model the optimal consumption
and portfolio choice problem of an entrepreneur who owns stock in a ﬁrm, but is
unable to sell this stock for a given period of time. In addition to this restricted
stock, the entrepreneur has liquid wealth which he can allocate between the stock
and bond markets. This feature is important since it allows the entrepreneur to take
a stock market position that oﬀsets some of the risk of his illiquid stockholdings and
reduces the cost of the restrictions. Note that allowing the entrepreneur to invest
in other markets diﬀerentiates this paper from earlier work (primarily focusing on
executive stock options rather than restricted stock) in which agents are not allowed
to hedge their undiversiﬁed positions in other markets (for example, see Hall and
Murphy, 2000b). This framework also allows us to study how the consumption level
(or lifestyle) of an entrepreneur is aﬀected by liquidity restrictions. The welfare
loss due to the liquidity restrictions is calculated by comparing the maximal utility
achieved by the entrepreneur with that achievable if the stockholdings were fully
liquid.
1There are many examples of entrepreneurs, managers, and others with signiﬁcant
stockholdings, initially worth millions on paper, who lost most of their wealth with-
out ever being allowed to sell any of their stockholdings. See the recent articles
on the eﬀects of selling restrictions on inside stockholders in The Wall Street Jour-
nal on March 23, 2001, April 12, 2001, April 25, 2001, and May 17, 2001, and in
Businessweek on April 17, 2000, and April 16, 2001.
1The results indicate that the cost of liquidity restrictions can be surprisingly
large. For example, when stock is restricted for ﬁve years and represents 50% of his
wealth, an entrepreneur would actually be better oﬀ if he could sell his restricted
stock for 30% to 80% of its unrestricted market value. Furthermore, these costs
can be signiﬁcantly higher when nearly all of the entrepreneur’s wealth is tied up
in restricted shares and when the entrepreneur is not able to hedge his restricted
shares with oﬀsetting stock market positions. These results contradict the widely
held practitioner view that restricted stock has only a minor cost to the recipient
(see Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2001, p. R1) and is a much more eﬃcient form
of compensation than executive stock options. These costs are roughly on the same
order of magnitude as those reported in studies of the cost of awarding executive
stock options such as Hall and Murphy (2000a, 2000b) and Meulbroek (2001).2 The
results also indicate that the cost of liquidity restrictions tends to be higher for
agents who are more risk averse. If the ability to innovate is not the same as the
ability to bear risk, however, this implies that liquidity restrictions may discourage
risk averse (but potentially highly productive) agents from entrepreneurial ventures.
Furthermore, these results suggest a possible basis for explaining the large valuation
discounts associated with private equity placements (see Wruck, 1989; and Silber
1992) and contribute to the growing literature on the eﬀects of illiquidity on security
values.3
We ﬁnd that owning restricted shares can have a dramatic eﬀect on the optimal
portfolio strategy for the liquid portion of the entrepreneur’s portfolio. Depending
on the ﬁrm’s correlation with the stock market, the entrepreneur can signiﬁcantly
increase or decrease his stock market holdings. This eﬀect is largest when the re-
stricted shares represent an intermediate fraction of the entrepreneur’s wealth. In-
terestingly, even when the correlation between the ﬁrm and the stock market is zero,
the entrepreneur can hold more of the stock market than he would in the absence
of liquidity restrictions. Intuitively, this is because taking additional stock market
risk helps smooth consumption variability caused by the temporary liquidity restric-
tions. Finally, we show that even though the entrepreneur can borrow against his
illiquid position, he chooses to consume at a much lower rate than he would without
liquidity restrictions.
This analysis also has implications for several areas in corporate ﬁnance. The
2Meulbroek (2001) uses an approach based on equalizing the Sharpe ratio between
the market and the illiquid stock to compute the discount. This preference-free
approach is easily applied and can be viewed as providing a lower bound on the
discount for the illiquid stock. We are grateful to Robert Merton for this insight.
3For example, see Mayers (1972, 1973), Grossman and Laroque (1990), Amihud and
Mendelson (1991), Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991, 1993), Kamara (1994), Longstaﬀ
(1995, 2001a, 2001b), Vayanos (1998), Huang (1998), and Brenner, Eldor, and
Hauser (2001).
2model suggests that restricted stock can be worth substantially less to managers who
have a large fraction of their wealth inve s t e di nt h e i rc o m p a n ya n df a c es i g n i ﬁcant
trading restrictions. This makes it a more costly corporate governance tool and
less eﬀective at reducing agency costs. Although we focus on restricted stock, this
implication is consistent with recent results in the executive stock option literature.
For examples of this literature, see Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Ru-
binstein (1995), Aboody (1996), Carpenter (1998, 2000), Hall and Murphy (2000a,
2000b), and Meulbroek (2001). Moreover, the high cost of the lack of diversiﬁca-
tion associated with concentrated managerial equity ownership gives managers a
strong incentive to make diversifying acquisitions even if not in the interests of their
shareholders (see Amihud and Lev, 1981; and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990).
Minimizing these costs can also provide an important motivation for taking a ﬁrm
public. Furthermore, the cost of these restrictions help explain the growing use of
diversifying strategies such as zero-cost collars and equity swaps documented by Bet-
tis, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2001). Finally, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(1999) show that in most countries, family ownership is the dominant ownership
structure even for the largest publicly traded ﬁrms. Our model suggests that the
costs imposed on the family owners due to a lack of diversiﬁcation can be signif-
icant. In an insightful recent paper, Hong and Huang (2001) argue that investor
relations eﬀorts by ﬁrms may be motivated by the goal of increasing trading volume
and thereby relaxing liquidity restrictions on corporate insiders.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a num-
ber of ways in which diﬀerent types of liquidity restrictions arise. Section 3 presents
the dynamic portfolio choice model. Section 4 examines the eﬀects of liquidity re-
strictions on welfare and optimal consumption and portfolio decisions. Section 5
discusses the implications of the results. Section 6 makes concluding remarks.
2. Liquidity Restrictions
There are many reasons why a shareholder might not be able to sell his shares
f o ra ne x t e n d e dp e r i o do ft i m e . I nt h i ss e c t i o n ,w ed e s c r i b ean u m b e ro fc o m m o n
situations in which shareholders are subject to these types of selling or liquidity
restrictions.
First, there are many situations in which selling restrictions are imposed by
contract, often to resolve moral hazard and adverse selection problems. One example
that has attracted substantial interest in the recent academic literature is that of
stock lockups in IPOs (see Brav and Gompers, 2000; Ofek and Richardson, 2000;
and Field and Hanka, 2001). These lockups are not required by the SEC, but are
part of the contract between the issuer and the underwriter in the vast majority of
IPOs. Most lockups do not allow company insiders (oﬃcers, directors, employees,
3their friends and family, and venture capitalists) to sell their shares for a period of
180 days. This restriction could be lifted for individual trades by the underwriter
in an early release, but this typically aﬀects only a small fraction of the stock held
by insiders (Brav and Gompers, 2000). The lockup period, however, can be longer
than 180 days. For example, Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) report that Morgan Stanley
a g r e e dt oat w o - y e a rl o c k u pp e r i o di ni t sI P O .
The literature oﬀers several economic reasons for IPO lockup provisions. First,
they provide a signal of the value of the company, as suggested by Welch (1989), and
modeled by Brau, Lambson, and McQueen (2001). Lockups make it less likely that
t h es h a r e sa r es o l dt ot h ep u b l i cs h o r t l yb e fore the release of negative information
about the ﬁrm. Brav and Gompers (2000) argue that the variation in the length
of the lockup period and the number of shares retained are systematically related
to the uncertainty about the ﬁrm’s value. Similarly, Longstaﬀ (1995) argues that
IPO underpricing could be partially due to the eﬀe c t so fl o c k u pp r o v i s i o n s . T h e
lockup period gives key employees and management an incentive to ensure good
corporate performance, at least until the insiders can sell their stock. Adding to the
importance of trading restrictions associated with insider share ownership in IPOs, it
is often the case that management and active investors (such as venture capitalists)
are subject to additional vesting agreements that go beyond the lockup period (Ofek
and Richardson, 2000).
Lockup or vesting periods play a similar role in managerial compensation con-
tracts. Many ﬁrms use restricted stock plans as part of the compensation package.
In these plans, managers receive a speciﬁed number of shares in the ﬁrm, but cannot
sell these shares for a given period of time. Moreover, the shares are forfeited if the
executive leaves the ﬁrm before the restriction period is over. Kole (1997) ﬁnds that
79 of 371 Fortune 500 ﬁrms in her sample have such restricted stock plans. The av-
erage minimum holding period before any shares can be sold ranges from 31 months
for ﬁr m sw i t ham e d i u ml e v e lo fr e s e a r c ha n dd e v e l o p m e n tt o7 4m o n t h sf o rﬁrms
with a high level of research and development. For more than a quarter of the plans,
the stock cannot be sold before retirement. The rationale for these minimal holding
p e r i o d si st h a ti tp r o v i d e sm a n a g e r sa ni n c e n t i v et ot a k ea c t i o n st h a ti n c r e a s et h e
long-term value of the ﬁrm, not just the short-term value. Furthermore, this tool is
used to increase managerial retention by creating substantial switching costs since
the restricted stock plan typically becomes void upon the departure of the manager.
Minimal vesting periods also typically apply to executive stock option plans,
which require the executive to hold the options for a prespeciﬁed time before ex-
ercising them. In Kole (1997), the average minimum waiting period before any of
the options can be exercised is 13.5 months. The average waiting period before the
options can be exercised (taking into account that some fraction of the options can
be exercised after the minimum waiting period, but the remainder only after an
additional waiting period) is 23.6 months.
4Another example where individuals obtain stock that cannot be sold for a certain
period is in a merger agreement where the target’s key employees and managers
obtain restricted stock in the combined company. Typically, such restricted stock
also comes with a lockup period during which it cannot be sold. The motivation
is similar to that for trading restrictions in executive compensation contracts. The
liquidity restrictions are intended to align the interests of the target’s key employees
and managers with the combined company and also give them an incentive to stay
with the combined company. This is of particular importance when the value of the
target company lies primarily in the human capital of its key employees, which is
likely the case in many start-ups. Finally, Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000) ﬁnd
that over 92% of the ﬁrms in their sample impose limitations on trading by corporate
insiders such as blackout periods during which trading is not allowed.
In addition to contractual restrictions, however, corporate insiders often have
signiﬁcant liquidity restrictions imposed on them for legal reasons. These legal re-
strictions can be even more stringent than the contractual restrictions. In some
cases, the legal restriction begins at the time the contractual restriction lapses and
signiﬁcantly extends the period of illiquidity. In general, a shareholder must satisfy
both the legal and contractual restrictions before selling this stock.
An important example of a legal restriction is SEC Rule 144 which limits the
amount of stock a corporate insider or aﬃliate can sell without registering the trans-
action. Under the Securities Act of 1933, an yp e r s o nw h os e l l sas e c u r i t yt oa n o t h e r
person must register that security with the SEC unless a statutory exemption can
be found for the transaction. Since the registration process can be prohibitively ex-
pensive and time consuming for many security holders, SEC Rule 144 was designed
to enable the public sale of limited amounts of unregistered securities under certain
conditions. These conditions are intended to avoid situations where securities are
acquired by an underwriter with a view to distributing them to the public without
going through the formal registration process. Since individual investors who are
not professionals in the securities business can be “underwriters” under the meaning
of the Securities Act, Rule 144 provides a safe harbor by which sales of unregistered
securities will not be construed as sales by an underwriter. Osborne (1982) provides
further discussion of the economic rationale provided by the SEC for Rule 144. The
cost of achieving this safe harbor, however, is that the securityholder must hold the
securities for a number of years, presumably to signal that the securities were not
acquired primarily to distribute them to the public without making the disclosures
required by the registration process.
The holding period required under Rule 144 depends on whether the security
holder is deﬁn e da sa na ﬃliate of the corporation. Aﬃliates include oﬃcers of the
corporation such as the CEO, president, senior oﬃcers, directors, spouses of oﬃcers,
relatives living in the same home as the oﬃcer, any persons in a position to exert
inﬂuence such as members of an oﬃcer’s family or close associates, and owners of
510% or more of the voting shares. Note that the deﬁnition of an aﬃliate is somewhat
broader than that of a corporate insider. Stock held by an aﬃliate is termed control
stock, and aﬃliates are often referred to as control persons.
Control stock can be acquired in a number of ways. For example, stock can
be acquired through compensation arrangements, exercise of stock options, payment
for professional services, venture capital arrangements, partnership distributions,
private placements, or even open market purchases. Rule 144 prohibits an aﬃliate
from selling restricted control stock for one year after the stock is acquired. After
the one-year period, however, there are a number of limitations placed on an aﬃliate
who wishes to sell control shares. Speciﬁcally, the aﬃl i a t ei so n l ya l l o w e dt os e l la n
amount of stock during any three-month period equal to the greater of one percent
of the total amount of shares outstanding or, if the ﬁrm is listed on a stock exchange
or quoted on Nasdaq, the average weekly reported trading volume in those shares
over the four weeks preceding the potential sale. Thus, for many smaller and less-
actively traded ﬁrms, it can take many years before a control shareholder is able
to completely liquidate a substantial equity stake in the ﬁrm. In addition to these
volume restrictions, current ﬁnancial information must be available regarding the
company whose securities are being sold. An aﬃliate must also ﬁle Form 144 with
the SEC for larger proposed sales. For a nonaﬃliate, similar liquidity restrictions
apply to their sales of restricted or unregistered stock, but only during the ﬁrst
two years after the stock is acquired. There are many other examples of liquidity
restrictions imposed by law such as the rules prohibiting insiders from trading during
periods surrounding earnings announcements.
Finally, since the eﬀect of liquidity restrictions on insiders is to increase the
concentration of their holdings in the ﬁrm, this analysis is relevant for the issue of
concentrated ownership in general. Speciﬁcally, ownership of many ﬁr m si sc o n c e n -
trated in the hands of a small number of investors, who often have a large fraction of
their wealth invested in these stocks. This is true for private equity as documented
by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2001). Moreover, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer (1999) ﬁnd that in most countries, the most common form of ownership
is family ownership, even for the largest publicly traded ﬁrms.
3. The Model
In this section, we model the portfolio choice of an agent where some portion
of his wealth is in shares that he cannot sell for a given period of time. An example
of this would be a corporate manager or entrepreneur who receives compensation
in the form of shares, but is prohibited from immediately selling those shares and
rebalancing his portfolio. To make the intuition as clear as possible, we use a simple
but realistic portfolio choice framework in which there are three types of assets: a
6riskless bond, a stock index fund, and the restricted stock that the entrepreneur
holds. This partial equilibrium framework is a simple generalization of the standard
Merton (1969, 1971) continuous-time framework.
Let Bt denote the value at time t of a riskless bond or money market fund with
dynamics given by
dB = rBdt, (1)
where r is the constant riskless interest rate. Let Mt denote the value of a risky
a s s e tw h i c hc a nb ev i e w e de i t h e ra st h estock market or a share in a stock index
fund. The dynamics of Mt are given by
dM =( r + µ)Mdt+ σMdZ1, (2)
where µ is the market risk premium and σ is the volatility of returns. Both µ and σ
are positive constants.
Although the entrepreneur is not allowed to trade his shares in the ﬁrm, we
assume that shares in the ﬁrm can be traded by others who are not subject to the
restriction. Let St denote the market value of a share of the ﬁrm’s stock. We assume
that the dynamics of St are given by
dS =( r + λ)Sdt+ νSdZ2, (3)
where λ is the excess expected return for the ﬁrm and ν is its volatility. Again, both
λ and ν are positive constants. The correlation between dZ1 and dZ2 is ρ dt,w h e r e
−1 < ρ < 1. This allows for the important possibility that returns on the market
a n do nt h eﬁrm’s stock are (potentially highly) correlated. To focus more directly on
the eﬀects of liquidity restrictions, we make the simplifying assumption that the risk
premium λ is given by the Capital Asset Pricing Model, implying that λ = µρν/σ.
An immediate implication of this assumption is that an unconstrained entrepreneur
w o u l dw a n tt oh o l dt h eﬁrm’s stock only to the extent that it appears in the stock
index. This implies that the unconstrained optimal portfolio weight for the ﬁrm’s
stock is zero.
The entrepreneur has an investment horizon of T<∞, and at time zero, is
given N shares of stock in his ﬁrm. To capture the essence of the liquidity restriction,
we assume that the entrepreneur cannot change the number of shares of stock he
holds until time τ ≤ T. This is consistent with actual practice where shareholders
are typically not allowed to change their position either directly by selling stock,
or indirectly by trading options or entering into equity swaps or similar types of
derivative contracts. After time τ, however, the entrepreneur can trade his shares
7in the ﬁrm without restriction. While the number of shares N the entrepreneur
holds does not change until time τ, the proportion of his wealth held in the form
of illiquid stock is stochastic. Let Xt = NSt/Wt denote the portfolio weight for
his illiquid stockholdings, where Wt denotes his total wealth at time t.S i n c eN is
assumed to be positive, Xt > 0 for all t<τ. Longstaﬀ (2001a) studies the optimal
portfolio choice problem in a model where an agent can only trade limited amounts
of a risky security per unit time. In an independent paper, Henderson and Hobson
(2001) develop a model similar to ours in which an agent is unable to trade shares
and oﬀer a series-based approximation for the optimal solution that is valid only
for small values of X. Our model diﬀers from theirs, however, in that we allow for
intermediate consumption. In addition, we study the eﬀects on consumption and
portfolio choice for general values of X.












= −∞,x < 0,
and where C denotes consumption, κ is the rate of time preference, and γ is the
risk-aversion parameter. The entrepreneur’s liquid wealth is given by (1 − Xt)Wt,
which he allocates between the riskless asset and the stock market. Let φt denote
the portfolio weight (as a percentage of his total wealth) for the stock market. Since
portfolio weights sum to one, the portfolio weight for the riskless asset is 1−φt−Xt.
In this framework, we allow the entrepreneur to take unlimited short positions in
both the riskless asset and the stock market. A review of industry practice indicates
that some investment ﬁrms allow investors to borrow a limited amount of funds on
the security of their restricted stockholdings. In fact, a number of ﬁnancial ﬁrms
specialize in what is termed Rule 144 lending. In actuality, however, it is easily shown
that if the entrepreneur allows his liquid wealth to become negative, then there is a
possibility of reaching negative total wealth. Intuitively, this happens because once
the value of the liquid part of the entrepreneur’s portfolio becomes negative, there is
a non-zero probability that it will remain negative. Furthermore, there is always a
possibility that the illiquid stock will decline in value towards zero before the liquidity
restriction lapses. Thus, the entrepreneur’s total wealth could become negative if X
becomes greater than one. Since this implies an expected utility of negative inﬁnity
in this model, the entrepreneur never chooses an investment strategy that allows
8liquid wealth to become negative. Thus, the entrepreneur never borrows against
illiquid stock, which implies that 0 <X≤ 1 for all t<τ.
Following Merton (1969, 1971), the entrepreneur’s wealth follows the dynamic
process
dW =( ( r + µφ + λX)W − C)dt + σφWdZ1 + νXWdZ2. (5)
The entrepreneur’s dynamic decision problem is to choose his consumption Ct and
the portfolio weight for the stock market φt in a way that maximizes his expected util-
ity subject to the dynamic budget constraint in Eq. (5). Allowing the entrepreneur
to make optimal portfolio choices is essential in estimating the cost of liquidity re-
strictions. In particular, simple certainty-equivalence approaches which do not allow
agents to select portfolios optimally can actually produce negative estimated costs,
implying the counterfactual result that restricted securities are worth more than
unrestricted securities. For example, Hall and Murphy (2000b) provide a further
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and that the ﬁrst-order conditions for the optimal consumption level C∗ and the



























The function F(X,t)s a t i s ﬁes a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation which is given in
the Appendix. Because expected utility equals −∞ if X exceeds one, FX(1,t)=∞
is required to hold at the boundary X = 1. Although F(X,t) cannot be solved in
9closed form, standard ﬁnite diﬀerence or simulation techniques can be applied to
provide numerical solutions for J(W, X, t)a n dt h ev a l u e so fC∗ and φ∗. Because
of the nonlinearity of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, standard existence
and uniqueness results for the solution cannot be applied. Thus, it is important to
acknowledge that in providing numerical estimates of the solution, we are implicitly
assuming that a solution exists and abstracting from uniqueness concerns. When
t ≥ τ, the liquidity restriction is no longer binding, X equals its unconstrained
optimal value of zero, and J(W, X, t) takes on the functional form J(W,t)s i n c ei t
no longer depends on X (the solution for J(W,t) is given at the end of this section).
From the ﬁrst-order conditions, the entrepreneur’s optimal consumption level C∗
and portfolio weight φ∗ are nonlinear functions of X. Despite this, some intuition
about the optimal strategies can be obtained by considering the structure of the
problem. In particular, when the entrepreneur faces no liquidity restrictions, utility
is maximized at every instant by solving a local mean-variance optimization problem.
In contrast, when the entrepreneur faces liquidity restrictions, the decision problem
c a nb ev i e w e da sab l e n do fab u y - a n d - h o ld problem with a standard problem of
continuous rebalancing, which means that the entrepreneur must now also consider
global portfolio changes.
Another way of seeing this is by noting from Eq. (5) that the dynamics of the
entrepreneur’s wealth are completely determined by the values of φ, X,a n dC.W h e n
the entrepreneur faces no liquidity restrictions, the entrepreneur is free to choose
any values of φ, X,a n dC, which gives full control over the distribution of wealth.
Because one can optimize choices of φ, X,a n dC individually, the optimal values of
these controls have the simple functional forms obtained by Merton (1969). When
there are trading restrictions, however, the initial value of X is given exogenously
and the entrepreneur can only choose the values of φ and C.I nt h i sc a s e ,φ and C
now play dual roles in maximizing the entrepreneur’s utility. Speciﬁcally, φ and C
aﬀect the dynamics of wealth directly as before. However, the values of φ and C
aﬀect the behavior of X over time, which has an indirect eﬀect on the dynamics of
wealth. For example, choosing a lower level of current consumption tends to reduce
future values of X. When there are liquidity restrictions, both the direct and indirect
eﬀects of φ and C on the distribution of wealth must be considered in maximizing
the entrepreneur’s utility. Not surprisingly, this makes the optimal values of φ and
C depend on X in very subtle and complex ways.
Despite this complexity, however, several comparative statics results can be
given. For example, as X → 0, the optimal portfolio weight φ∗ converges to the
constant portfolio weight
µ
γσ2 given in Merton (1969). As X → 1, both φ∗ and C∗
converge to zero. The intuition for this is that if the entrepreneur’s liquid wealth were
to reach zero, the entrepreneur would need to prevent liquid wealth from becoming
negative. Thus, the entrepreneur would avoid any further market risk in the liquid
portfolio by placing zero weight in the stock market. Furthermore, the entrepreneur
10would forego consumption rather than borrowing against illiquid wealth and creating
a negative liquid wealth position. In actuality, the entrepreneur’s optimal consump-
tion and investment strategies serve to insure that liquid wealth remains positive.
By guaranteeing that liquid wealth is always nonnegative, the entrepreneur’s op-
timal consumption and portfolio strategies also insure that total wealth is always
nonnegative. Dybvig and Huang (1988) show that requiring wealth to be nonneg-
ative eliminates unrealistic strategies such as the doubling strategy discussed by
Harrison and Kreps (1979).
In the special case where µ = γρσν, φ∗ reduces to ρν(1 − X)/σ, which implies
that the optimal portfolio strategy is a simple linear function of X. Finally, note
that the second term on the right hand side of Eq. (9) represents minus the amount
of the market portfolio “embedded” in the restricted stock. To see this, recall that
the stock return can be decomposed into two components: a component equal to
the stock’s beta times the return on the market, and an idiosyncratic component.
Thus, a position in the stock with portfolio weight of X has the same exposure to
the market as a position in the stock index with portfolio weight βX =
ρν
σ X.T h i s
means that the total eﬀective position in the market equals φ∗ plus
ρν
σ X,o rs i m p l y
the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of Eq. (9).4
To evaluate the welfare loss to the entrepreneur of being constrained to hold
X percent of wealth in the form of restricted stock, we compare J(W,X,t)w i t h
the derived utility of wealth that the entrepreneur would have in the absence of any
liquidity restrictions, which we denote J(W,t). Again following Merton (1969, 1971),




























The optimal consumption and portfolio strategies in the absence of liquidity restric-
tions are also provided in the appendix. Finally, we note that when t ≥ τ,t h e
liquidity constraint is no longer binding and the indirect utility of wealth function
J(W,X,t) reduces to the function J(W, t)g i v e ni nE q .( 1 0 ) .
4. The Eﬀects Of Liquidity Restrictions
4We are grateful to the referee for this insight.
11In this section, we study the eﬀects of liquidity restrictions on the entrepreneur.
We focus ﬁrst on the welfare eﬀects of these restrictions and estimate their economic
costs. We then examine how liquidity restrictions aﬀect the optimal portfolio deci-
sion. Finally, we consider how the optimal consumption policy changes when there
are restrictions.
4.1. The cost of liquidity restrictions
The fundamental issue that needs to be addressed is how the entrepreneur’s
overall welfare is aﬀected by liquidity restrictions. The welfare costs of these restric-
tions can be calculated directly by simply contrasting the entrepreneur’s derived
utility of wealth J(W,X,t) in the presence of liquidity restrictions with the derived
utility of wealth J(W,t) corresponding to the case where there are no restrictions.
In comparing the values of J(W,X,t)a n dJ(W, t), we use the following intuitive
metric. Speciﬁcally, we solve for the implied value of the restricted stock at which the
entrepreneur would be indiﬀerent between continuing to hold restricted shares, or
selling them and then investing the proceeds plus liquid holdings without restrictions.
We then compute the ratio between this implied value and the market value of stock.
For simplicity, we will refer to this ratio simply as the implied value of the restricted
stock. Table 1 reports these ratios for diﬀerent values of the risk-aversion coeﬃcient
γ, the beta of the ﬁrm β = ρν/σ, the volatility of the ﬁrm’s returns ν, and for
diﬀerent levels of X and τ. These values are chosen to provide a cross section of
realistic possible scenarios. For example, we consider illiquidity horizons of one, two,
and ﬁv ey e a r s . T h e s eh o r i z o n sr e p r e s e n tt h el e n g t ho ft i m et h a ta ne n t r e p r e n e u r
with a signiﬁcant stake in the ﬁrm might need to sell a position. In addition, Table
1 considers volatilities for the ﬁrm of 30% and 60%. These volatilities are consistent
with those recently experienced by many individual Nasdaq stocks. Fig. 1 graphs the
implied stock values as functions of X for various combinations of the parameters.
As shown, the implied value of restricted stock to a entrepreneur facing liquidity
restrictions can be signiﬁcantly less than its unrestricted market value. For example,
when the entrepreneur has a risk-aversion coeﬃcient of two, the illiquidity horizon
is ﬁve years, and the restricted stock represents 50% of total wealth, the implied
value of a dollar of restricted stock rangesf r o m4 2t o8 2c e n t s .S i m i l a r l y ,w h e nt h e
entrepreneur has a risk-aversion coeﬃcient of four, the illiquidity horizon is ﬁve years,
and the restricted stock again represents 50% of total wealth, the implied value of
restricted stock ranges from 30 to 70 cents. As illustrated, the costs of illiquidity
can be signiﬁcantly larger when the restricted stock represents nearly all of the
entrepreneur’s wealth. As discussed earlier, an entrepreneur with a large stake in an
infrequently traded start-up venture could easily ﬁnd these examples representative
of his situation. The magnitude of these implied costs are clearly on the same
order of magnitude as the implied costs associated with executive stock options. For
example, Hall and Murphy (2000b, p. 11) ﬁnd that executive stock options are only
worth 40% to 60% of their Black-Scholes value. Similarly, Meulbroek (2001) argues
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value. These results indicate that the impact of illiquidity on restricted stock values
can be just as severe as on executive stock option values. This is important given
the widely held belief among practitioners that restricted stock is far more valuable
to recipients than are stock options (for example, see Wall Street Journal, April 12,
2001, p. R1).
T h ei m p l i e dv a l u eo fr e s t r i c t e ds t o c ka saf r a c t i o no fm a r k e tv a l u ei sad e c r e a s i n g
function of X. This is intuitive since the greater the value of X, the more binding is
the liquidity constraint. The eﬀect of the diversiﬁcation constraint is compounded by
the length of the liquidity restriction. Table 1 shows that as the length of the liquidity
restriction horizon grows from one to ﬁve years, the implied value of the restricted
stock can decrease more than proportionately. This eﬀect is particularly evident for
high values of X. The results indicate, however, that the interplay between X and
τ is complex. The interaction between the illiquidity horizon and the percentage of
illiquid assets depends nonlinearly on the parameters.
The results in Table 1 also illustrate that the implied value of restricted stock
is a decreasing function of the level of the entrepreneur’s risk-aversion coeﬃcient γ.
Thus, illiquid shares are worth less to economic agents who are more risk averse. This
has important economic eﬃciency implications since the ability to bear portfolio risk
is not necessarily the same as the ability to innovate. Thus, liquidity restrictions,
such as those imposed by SEC Rule 144 that primarily impact start-ups and other
young ﬁrms, can have the unintended eﬀect of discouraging risk averse but otherwise
innovative agents from forming new ventures.
T h er e s u l t si nT a b l e1a l s oi n d i c a t et h a tthe ability to hedge the risk of illiquid
stockholdings has an important eﬀect on the implied value of restricted stock. When
β = 0 and the returns of the ﬁrm are uncorrelated with the market, the implied value
of the restricted stock is signiﬁcantly lower than when β = 1. For example, in the
case where γ =4 ,ν =0 .30, τ =5 ,a n dX =0 .50, the implied restricted stock
value is 0.613 when β = 0 but 0.702 when β = 1. Similar results hold for other
parameter values in the table. This underscores the importance of examining the
costs of illiquidity within the context of a portfolio choice model that allows the
entrepreneur to hedge using alternative liquid securities.
Finally, Table 1 shows that the implied value of restricted stock is decreasing in
the volatility of the ﬁrm’s returns. The reason for this is clear because an increase in
ν implies that the undiversiﬁed illiquid position held by the entrepreneur is riskier
without any compensating increase in its expected return (since β is held constant).
4.2. The optimal portfolio strategy
Without liquidity restrictions, the Appendix shows that the entrepreneur would
invest a constant fraction of his wealth in the stock market and would place the
remainder in the risk-free asset. Thus, an unconstrained entrepreneur would not
13invest in the individual stock directly. Intuitively, this follows since the CAPM
holds for the individual stock and the entrepreneur ﬁnds it optimal to invest in
the diversiﬁed market portfolio rather than being exposed to the idiosyncratic risk
of a position in the individual ﬁrm. This result is standard in traditional models
of optimal portfolio choice. Note that by taking a position in the stock market,
however, the entrepreneur has an indirect position in the ﬁrm’s stock to the extent
that it is a component of the market.
The entrepreneur’s optimal portfolio behavior is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in the
presence of liquidity restrictions. As implied by the ﬁrst-order condition in Eq. (9),
the optimal portfolio weight φ∗ d e p e n d si nac o m p l e xw a yo nt h ef r a c t i o no ft h e
entrepreneur’s wealth that is tied up in restricted stock. For example, it is easily
shown that the entrepreneur does not simply apply the unconstrained optimal port-
folio strategy to the liquid portion of his portfolio. To show how liquidity restrictions
aﬀect the entrepreneur’s portfolio strategy, Table 2 presents the optimal portfolio
weights for the stock market, where the weight is expressed as a percentage of liquid
(not total) wealth. Thus, Table 2 reports the portfolio weights φ∗/(1 − X)f o rt h e
same values of τ and X as in Table 1. Examples of these portfolio weights are also
graphed in Fig. 2.
Table 2 shows that the presence of liquidity restrictions can have a major eﬀect
on the entrepreneur’s optimal portfolio choice. For small values of X,t h eo p t i m a l
portfolio weight is close to the optimal portfolio weight for the unconstrained case.
As X increases, however, the entrepreneur’s portfolio weight quickly diverges from
the unconstrained portfolio weight. When β = 1 and the entrepreneur is able to
partially hedge the risk of his illiquid position, the optimal portfolio weight can be
substantially below the unconstrained weight. This is particularly true for shorter
illiquidity horizons. In some cases, the presence of liquidity restrictions can lead to
the entrepreneur actually taking a short position in the stock market, something
that would not occur in the unrestricted case (when µ>0). The reason for this
is clearly due to the fact that the entrepreneur partially negates the eﬀects of the
constraint by taking a oﬀsetting position in the stock market.
Interestingly, when stock market returns are uncorrelated with the ﬁrm’s returns
and β = 0, the entrepreneur may still ﬁnd it optimal to deviate signiﬁcantly from the
unconstrained portfolio weight. For example, when γ =2 ,β =0 ,ν =0 .30, τ =1 ,
and X =0 .70, the entrepreneur places 178.1% of the liquid portfolio in the stock
market. In the absence of liquidity constraints, however, the entrepreneur would
place only 62.5% of the liquid portfolio in the stock market. This illustrates that the
hedging motive is not the only reason why the constrained portfolio decision diﬀers
from the unconstrained case, since direct hedging is not possible when β =0 . T h e
intuition for why the entrepreneur takes a more aggressive stock market position
when β = 0 is related to a desire to smooth consumption over time. Recall that
because of the risk of ruin, it is never optimal for the entrepreneur to consume out
14of illiquid wealth. On the other hand, when τ is small and X is relatively large, the
entrepreneur knows that it is very likely that there will be far more wealth available
for consumption once the liquidity restriction lapses. In anticipation of this, the
entrepreneur has an incentive to invest more aggressively in the short term in order
to increase the expected value of his liquid wealth. By increasing the expected value
of the liquid portion of his portfolio, the entrepreneur is able to increase the current
consumption rate and partially reduce the size of the jump in consumption that is
likely to occur when the liquidity restriction lapses.
As τ increases, the deviation of the optimal portfolio weight from the uncon-
strained case diminishes. The reason for this is that both the hedging and consump-
tion smoothing motives for deviating from the unconstrained optimal are blunted
as τ increases since the total variance of the value of the illiquid position becomes
much larger relative to that of the liquid portfolio. Thus, the expected beneﬁts of
either hedging or consumption smoothing are swamped by the uncertainty in the
ﬁnal value of the restricted stock.
Interestingly, as X increases towards one, the deviation of the optimal portfo-
lio weight from the unconstrained weight converges back to zero. For some of the
examples in Table 2, convergence isn’t fully evident for X =0 .90. In all cases,
however, the convergence to zero is nearly complete for X =0 .99. Thus, the great-
est opportunities for hedging and consumption smoothing occur when the size of
the liquid portfolio is on the same order as the size of the illiquid portfolio. As X
approaches one, the entrepreneur receives little beneﬁt from either hedging or con-
sumption smoothing. An alternatively way of thinking about this is by noting that
X is a state variable in the sense of Merton (1969, 1971). Hence, deviations from the
unconstrained portfolio weight can be viewed as attempts to hedge the instantaneous
risk of changes to the investment opportunity set caused by continuous stochastic
ﬂuctuations in X. As is easily shown by an application of Itˆ o ’ sL e m m a ,h o w e v e r ,t h e
instantaneous volatility of X converges to zero as X approaches either zero or one;
the instantaneous volatility of changes in X is greatest for intermediate values of
X. Because of this, the largest deviation from the unconstrained case occurs when
the volatility of the state variable X is the largest, which happens for intermediate
values of X. Finally, Table 2 shows that the portfolio weight is a decreasing function
of the risk aversion parameter γ.
4.3. Optimal consumption
In this framework, the entrepreneur takes unlimited short positions in the liquid
assets. Because of this, the entrepreneur could potentially maintain the same level of
consumption over time that would be optimal in the absence of liquidity restrictions.
From the ﬁrst-order condition in Eq. (8), however, it is clear that the entrepreneur’s
optimal consumption rate will diﬀer through its dependence on the portfolio weight
X for the restricted stock.
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reports the ratio of the optimal consumption rate in the restricted case to the optimal
consumption rate in the unrestricted case. In addition, Fig. 3 plots the ratios for
selected parameter values. As shown, a entrepreneur facing liquidity restrictions
often ﬁnds it optimal to curtail consumption severely. For example, when τ =5
and the illiquid stock represents 50% of total wealth, the entrepreneur consumes
roughly 63% to 85% as much as one would in the absence of liquidity restrictions.
When nearly all of the entrepreneur’s wealth is in the form of restricted stock, the
entrepreneur may actually consume less than 20% as much as one would otherwise.
Decreases in consumption of this magnitude clearly have major lifestyle im-
plications for an entrepreneur who has most of his wealth in the form of illiquid
stock. The larger the proportion of his wealth in the illiquid stock, the more the
entrepreneur “tightens his belt” and limits his consumption. Thus, despite that the
entrepreneur could maintain his level of consumption, the entrepreneur prefers to
partially hedge the portfolio risk created by the restrictions by deferring consump-
tion until the restrictions lapse. On the other hand, however, it is easily shown (by
dividing the consumption ratios in Table 3 by (1 − X)) that the entrepreneur con-
sumes at a higher rate than if one had only liquid wealth and no restricted stock at
all.
An increase in the length of the period of illiquidity generally reduces the en-
trepreneur’s consumption rate. Interestingly, an increase in γ does not always trans-
late into a decrease in consumption, particularly when X is relatively large. This is
not altogether surprising since even in the unrestricted problem, optimal consump-
tion is not a monotonic function of the risk-aversion parameter γ. In contrast, an
increase in the volatility of the ﬁrm’s returns generally results in a decrease in the
optimal consumption rate. Finally, observe that when β = 1 and the entrepreneur
can partially hedge illiquid wealth through the stock market, the entrepreneur is
typically able to consume at a higher rate than when β =0 .
5. Discussion
These results have interesting implications for the important issue of how illiq-
uidity aﬀects ﬁnancial assets. While it is important to acknowledge that we provide
only a partial equilibrium analysis of the cost of liquidity restrictions, the results are
at least broadly consistent with the empirical evidence of large discounts associated
with illiquid securities. Wruck (1989) ﬁnds that private equity oﬀerings for large
publicly traded companies can be placed at discounts of as much as 15%. Silber
(1992) ﬁnds that restricted Rule 144 stock with a two-year trading restriction is pri-
vately placed at an average discount of 35% to otherwise identical registered stock.
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Kamara (1994) ﬁnd that the yields on illiquid
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liquid but otherwise identical Treasury bills. Boudoukh and Whitelaw (1991) show
that benchmark Japanese Government bonds trade at a large price premium to non-
benchmark bonds that are virtually identical. Brenner, Eldor, and Hauser (2001)
ﬁnd that illiquid currency options often sell for as much as 20% less than the price
of their liquid counterparts. Longstaﬀ (1992) ﬁnds that callable Treasury bonds can
actually trade at a higher price than the portfolio of illiquid Treasury bonds which
replicates an identical noncallable bond, eﬀectively implying a negative value for the
call feature. Longstaﬀ (2001b) also shows a large time-varying liquidity component
in the prices of Treasury bonds. THis component is related to measures of mar-
ket sentiment such as consumer conﬁdence and ﬂows into stock and money market
mutual funds. Theoretical models of the valuation eﬀects of illiquidity on securities
prices include Mayers (1972, 1973), Grossman and Laroque (1990), Boudoukh and
Whitelaw (1993), Longstaﬀ (1995), Vayanos (1998), Huang (1998), and Longstaﬀ
(2001a).
Our analysis also has implications for several areas of corporate ﬁnance. For
example, our model suggests that restricted stock can be worth substantially less to
an executive than it costs the issuing ﬁrm. A similar point is made in the existing
literature on executive compensation packages, although this literature focuses pri-
marily on stock options (see Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991; Rubinstein,
1995; Carpenter, 1998, 2000; and Hall and Murphy, 2000a, 2000b). Hence, our anal-
ysis lends support to the view that one reason why total CEO compensation is so
high may be that the vast majority of it is in the form of restricted securities. Our
calculations imply, however, that the illiquidity costs of restricted stock are larger
t h a ns u g g e s t e di ns o m eo ft h ee a r l i e rl i t e r a t ure, and hence restricted stock is a less ef-
ﬁcient form of compensation than commonly believed (see Hall and Murphy, 2000b).
Although well beyond the scope of our paper, an interesting extension could be to
solve for optimal contracts in a model that captures both the costs and beneﬁts of
liquidity restrictions. Such beneﬁts might include reductions in agency costs.
Another implication, argue Amihud and Lev (1981), is that the high illiquidity
costs of concentrated managerial equity holdings give managers a strong incentive
to diversify their ﬁrms, perhaps through acquisitions, even if it is not in the interest
of their shareholders. This is consistent with Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990),
who show that acquirer returns are negative if a ﬁrm acquires another ﬁrm in an
unrelated business line.
Our model also has implications for the costs of concentrated ownership more
generally, even if they are not caused by contractual or legal lockup periods. For
example, IPOs help insiders cash out and hence diversify their portfolio by creating
a more liquid market in the ﬁrm’s shares. Thus, they reduce the costs of holding
an undiversiﬁed portfolio and for this reason can be valuable to insiders. Because
insiders put a high value on the diversiﬁcation of their portfolios made possible by an
17IPO, they can take ﬁrms public earlier than is socially optimal. Moreover, they may
accept a substantial amount of underpricing, as found in the empirical literature (for
a summary, see Ibbotson and Ritter, 1995).
A related implication concerns private equity in general. For the U.S. owners
of private equity earn no higher returns tha nt h eo w n e r so fp u b l i ce q u i t y ,a l t h o u g h
they have a much less diversiﬁed portfolio. More than 75% of private equity is owned
by households for which this constitutes at least half of their wealth. Moreover,
households with positive private equity invest on average more than 70% of their
private holdings in a single ﬁrm in whose management they participate (Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2001). Presumably, these positions are held over a very long
horizon. These ﬁndings give rise to a “private equity premium puzzle.” Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2001) do not calculate the costs associated with such a lack
of diversiﬁcation, but suggest that they can be large. Our paper oﬀers one way to
calculate these costs and conﬁrms that they can be very large.
More generally, family ownership is in most countries the prevalent owner-
ship structure, even for the largest publicly traded companies (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999). Our model suggests that the costs imposed on the family
owners of these ﬁr m sd u et oal a c ko fd i v e r s i ﬁcation can be very large, since they pre-
sumably hold their large positions for a long time. Hence, it suggests that the costs
of weak shareholder protection, which can lead to highly concentrated ownership
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999), are very signiﬁcant. These illiquid-
ity costs of concentrated ownership should be taken into account in comparisons of
ﬁnancial systems that lead to widely diﬀering degrees of ownership concentration.
One could argue that the willingness of investors to hold these large blocks suggests
that the positive eﬀects of such concentrated ownership on corporate governance or
the private beneﬁts of control derived by the blockholders must be very substantial.
6. Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀects on stockholders of liquidity restrictions. These
types of liquidity restrictions are imposed on many types of shareholders, but are
particularly pervasive among stakeholders in new ventures such as entrepreneurs,
venture capitalists, and private equity holders. To study these eﬀects, we model
the optimal consumption and portfolio choice problem from the perspective of an
entrepreneur who is given restricted stock which cannot be sold for a ﬁxed hori-
zon. The entrepreneur can partially hedge the risk of the restricted stock by taking
oﬀsetting positions in the stock and bond markets.
Despite being able to trade in other securities, however, the economic costs to
the entrepreneur of the liquidity restrictions can be very large. In some cases, the
entrepreneur would actually prefer to sell his restricted stock for a small fraction of
18its market value. These costs are on the same order of magnitude as those shown
e x e c u t i v es t o c ko p t i o n s .T h ep r e s e n c eo f liquidity restrictions also has major eﬀects
on the entrepreneur’s optimal portfolio choice. When stock market returns are cor-
related with the returns on the ﬁrm’s stock, the entrepreneur may invest far more (or
far less) in the stock market than if there were no liquidity restrictions. Even when
there is no correlation between the returns, however, the entrepreneur has incentives
to take a more aggressive position in the stock market in order to smooth consump-
tion over time. Liquidity restrictions can induce the entrepreneur to severely curtail
his current consumption or lifestyle as an additional way of hedging the risk of his
restricted stock. These results show clearly that an entrepreneur who may be a mil-
lionaire on paper (in the sense of owning a signiﬁcant amount of restricted stock)
behaves far diﬀerently from an entrepreneur with the same amount of wealth but
without liquidity restrictions.
There are a number of possible directions for future research. In this paper, we
focus exclusively on modeling the costs imposed by liquidity restrictions since the
potential beneﬁts of these restrictions in reducing agency costs, signalling informa-
tion about the ﬁrm, and retaining key employees and managers are well understood
in the literature. Clearly, however, it would be interesting to combine both strands
of literature within a single model that would balance the costs and beneﬁts and
allow us to solve for optimal contracts. In addition, future research could examine
the implications of liquidity restrictions within the context of a general equilibrium
model in which some agents are not allowed to sell their shares and stock prices are
endogenously determined (for example, see Mayers, 1972, 1973).
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Using the deﬁnition of X, the dynamic budget constraint can be expressed as
dW =( rW + µφW + λNS− C)dt + σφWdZ1 + νNSdZ2. (11)
Since W and S form a jointly Markov process, the derived utility of wealth J(W,S,t)
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which implies that we can rewrite the derived utility of wealth as J(W, X,t) by making a
change of variables from S to X.D i ﬀerentiating this expression (via the chain rule) with
respect to the variables W, S,a n dt and substituting into the ﬁrst-order conditions gives
Eqs. (8) and (9). Note that Eqs. (8) and (9) imply that C∗/W and φ∗ depend on W
and S only through X. Substituting Eqs. (8) and (9) into the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
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Observe that Eq. (16) depends only on F(X,t) and its derivatives with respect to X
and t.F u r t h e r m o r e , C∗/W and φ∗ depend only on F(X,t) and its derivatives with
respect to X. Thus, our conjecture is veriﬁed if we can demonstrate that F(X,t)i s
independent of W on the boundaries.
To demonstrate this, we consider ﬁrst the terminal condition at t = τ when the liquidity
restriction lapses. Once the stock is no longer illiquid, then the manager’s problem be-
comes a standard portfolio choice problem with two risky assets. The optimal portfolio
strategy is given directly from Merton (1969) implying that the manager invests
µ
γσ2
in the stock market and zero in the stock. Thus, the problem reduces further to the
case of a single risky asset. In this case, equation (26) of Merton (1969) implies that
the unconstrained derived utility of wealth function J(W,t)i so ft h ef o r mg i v e ni nE q .















These results imply that J(W,X,τ)=J(W, τ). Substituting into Eq. (15) then implies
the terminal condition for F(X,τ). This terminal condition, along with the boundary
conditions FX(0,t)=0a n dFX(1,t)=∞, implies that the function F(X,t)d o e sn o t
explicitly depend on W, verifying the conjecture.
In solving for F(X,t), we follow Brennan, Schwartz, and Lagnado (1997) and compute
the function values numerically using a standard implicit ﬁnite diﬀerence technique.
In particular, we linearize the partial diﬀerential equation for F(X,t) in Eq. (16) by
evaluating C∗/W and φ∗ using the estimated values of the function and its derivatives
at time t + ∆t. Since the variation in the values of C∗/W and φ∗ with respect to time
is far smaller than the values of F(X,t) and its derivatives, this linearization performs
well. To insure the accuracy of this linearization scheme, however, we use extremely
small steps in the time direction; the value of the function F(X,t) is computed using
1,000 time steps per year (virtually identical results are obtained using smaller times,
such as 10,000 steps per year). In this implicit ﬁnite diﬀerence scheme, we use 200
steps for the variable X.T h u s , X ranges from zero to one in steps of 0.005. As arobustness check on the results, we also calculate the value of F(X,t) using an explicit
ﬁnite diﬀerence algorithm which does not require linearization since all derivatives with
respect to X are evaluated at time t + ∆t. The results are virtually identical to those
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Implied value of restricted stock
This table reports the implied value of restricted stock as a fraction of its unrestricted market value. The
implied value is calculated by solving for the fraction of the market value that a share of the ﬁrm’s stock
would need to sell for in the unrestricted case to give the same utility to the entrepreneur as achieved in
the restricted case. The implied values are reported for an entrepreneur with varying fractions of wealth
held in the form of stock that is illiquid for a period of τ years. The entrepreneur’s risk-aversion coeﬃcient
is γ. The volatility and beta of the illiquid stock are ν and β respectively. The riskless rate is 5%, the
expected premium on the stock market is 5%, the volatility of returns on the stock market is 20%, and the
entrepreneur’s ﬁnal investment horizon is ten years. The rate of time preference equals the riskless rate.
Fraction of Illiquid Wealth
γβ ντ 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
2 0 0.30 1 0.990 0.972 0.954 0.936 0.887
2 0.979 0.941 0.906 0.865 0.669
5 0.929 0.828 0.719 0.536 0.212
2 0 0.60 1 0.959 0.894 0.838 0.783 0.705
2 0.909 0.795 0.706 0.620 0.472
5 0.730 0.541 0.420 0.306 0.152
2 1 0.30 1 0.995 0.984 0.974 0.964 0.931
2 0.988 0.967 0.946 0.923 0.720
5 0.962 0.900 0.818 0.605 0.222
2 1 0.60 1 0.964 0.905 0.854 0.803 0.735
2 0.920 0.815 0.732 0.650 0.506
5 0.760 0.576 0.454 0.335 0.165
4 0 0.30 1 0.981 0.946 0.913 0.881 0.828
2 0.959 0.892 0.833 0.773 0.556
5 0.877 0.730 0.613 0.444 0.148
4 0 0.60 1 0.924 0.817 0.730 0.645 0.541
2 0.845 0.680 0.565 0.458 0.322
5 0.617 0.412 0.300 0.208 0.103
4 1 0.30 1 0.989 0.969 0.949 0.929 0.861
2 0.977 0.936 0.897 0.850 0.568
5 0.927 0.820 0.702 0.480 0.148
4 1 0.60 1 0.932 0.833 0.751 0.671 0.568
2 0.859 0.703 0.590 0.485 0.343
5 0.643 0.437 0.321 0.224 0.108Table 2
Optimal portfolio weights
This table reports the optimal portfolio weight for the stock market, expressed as a fraction of total liquid
wealth, for an entrepreneur with varying fractions of wealth held in the form of stock that is illiquid for a
period of τ years. The entrepreneur’s risk-aversion coeﬃcient is γ. The volatility and beta of the illiquid
stock are ν and β respectively. The riskless rate is 5%, the expected premium on the stock market is 5%,
the volatility of returns on the stock market is 20%, and the entrepreneur’s ﬁnal investment horizon is ten
years. The rate of time preference equals the riskless rate.
Fraction of Illiquid Wealth
No Illiquid
γβ ντ Wealth 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
2 0 0.30 1 0.625 0.692 0.872 1.171 1.781 0.703
2 0.625 0.690 0.851 1.096 1.287 0.606
5 0.625 0.682 0.781 0.782 0.661 0.621
2 0 0.60 1 0.625 0.687 0.824 1.021 1.383 1.031
2 0.625 0.679 0.779 0.901 1.054 0.752
5 0.625 0.660 0.701 0.728 0.728 0.662
2 1 0.30 1 0.625 0.584 0.472 0.278 -0.157 0.613
2 0.625 0.585 0.479 0.305 0.120 0.640
5 0.625 0.588 0.508 0.530 0.622 0.627
2 1 0.60 1 0.625 0.587 0.502 0.377 0.137 0.387
2 0.625 0.592 0.527 0.447 0.338 0.566
5 0.625 0.602 0.574 0.557 0.561 0.609
4 0 0.30 1 0.313 0.346 0.430 0.565 0.851 0.452
2 0.313 0.344 0.416 0.519 0.697 0.334
5 0.313 0.338 0.382 0.408 0.348 0.315
4 0 0.60 1 0.313 0.341 0.399 0.473 0.600 0.871
2 0.313 0.337 0.375 0.416 0.476 0.522
5 0.313 0.327 0.342 0.354 0.365 0.367
4 1 0.30 1 0.313 0.238 0.040 -0.294 -0.972 0.056
2 0.313 0.240 0.061 -0.216 -0.483 0.271
5 0.313 0.248 0.129 0.111 0.268 0.301
4 1 0.60 1 0.313 0.248 0.115 -0.059 -0.365 -0.731
2 0.313 0.258 0.168 0.068 -0.076 -0.093
5 0.313 0.279 0.243 0.213 0.190 0.218Table 3
Optimal consumption rates
This table reports the ratio of the optimal consumption rate for an entrepreneur with varying fractions of
wealth held in the form of stock that is illiquid for a period of τ years to the optimal consumption rate in
the unrestricted case. The entrepreneur’s risk-aversion coeﬃcient is γ. The volatility and beta of the illiquid
stock are ν and β respectively. The riskless rate is 5%, the expected premium on the stock market is 5%,
the volatility of returns on the stock market is 20%, and the entrepreneur’s ﬁnal investment horizon is ten
years. The rate of time preference equals the riskless rate.
Fraction of Illiquid Wealth
γβ ντ 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90
2 0 0.30 1 0.999 0.988 0.966 0.934 0.666
2 0.997 0.974 0.933 0.850 0.381
5 0.990 0.929 0.796 0.533 0.180
2 0 0.60 1 0.994 0.956 0.889 0.794 0.573
2 0.987 0.919 0.812 0.661 0.352
5 0.966 0.837 0.665 0.451 0.173
2 1 0.30 1 0.999 0.993 0.981 0.963 0.702
2 0.998 0.985 0.961 0.912 0.388
5 0.994 0.957 0.845 0.546 0.180
2 1 0.60 1 0.995 0.960 0.899 0.812 0.606
2 0.989 0.926 0.826 0.685 0.366
5 0.969 0.847 0.680 0.465 0.176
4 0 0.30 1 0.998 0.980 0.947 0.898 0.723
2 0.995 0.961 0.900 0.811 0.425
5 0.985 0.907 0.778 0.545 0.190
4 0 0.60 1 0.991 0.935 0.844 0.716 0.524
2 0.982 0.891 0.758 0.584 0.335
5 0.958 0.811 0.632 0.424 0.172
4 1 0.30 1 0.999 0.988 0.969 0.938 0.715
2 0.997 0.976 0.938 0.861 0.422
5 0.991 0.936 0.815 0.554 0.190
4 1 0.60 1 0.992 0.941 0.855 0.734 0.540
2 0.983 0.898 0.771 0.602 0.346
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